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Public Policy and the Urban Fiscal Problem:
Piecemeal vs. Aggregate Solutionst
By ROY W. BAHL*
Introduction

A NECESSARY
FIRST STEP toward resolving the financial crisis facing
American cities is a proper definition of
the urban fiscal problem, i.e., a separation of the fiscal problems of metropol-

itan areas from those which exist by

virtue of metropolitanism. Consider this
dissection: We are impelled to separate

immediately the Galbraith problem -

that of underinvestment in the public
sector - as a general ill of society and
not necessarily a result of any particular governmental form.' Then the urban fiscal problem must relate to the
compounding of this general social imbalance by metropolitanism, i.e., by the
fragmentation of local government and
by the spatial clustering of both ends of

of ex-post, city-suburb differences, it is
not unexpected that discussion of remedial public finance policy is cast in terms
of effectiveness in reducing these differences. Nor is it surprising that much
public policy is suggested as corrective
action for particular imbalances. Hence,
suggested disparity-reducing programs
are almost as numerous as the specific
disparities they are designed to correct.
In short, the problem solving approach
is piecemeal.

The basic objective of this paper is to

explore the implications of piecemeal

versus aggregative approaches to resolving the fiscal ills of metropolitan regions.

Since a necessary prerequisite to discus-

sion of any urban public policy is a

systematic definition of the disparities
problem, the following section is given
the income distribution within the Stanover to developing the rudiments of a
dard Metropolitan Area, hereinafter retheory of metropolitan fiscal imbalance.
ferred to as SMSA. Most recently the
This conceptual framework is then used
effects of this compounding are re(a) to evaluate, in general terms, that
ferred to as metropolitan disparities, the
current
governmental policy which is
focus being on the complex set of inter-

relationships between cities and sub-

urbs, and among suburbs of different
t This
types.2 But while valuable in that they

paper was written while the author was at
Syracuse University as a Resources for the Future Post

point out the present state of urbanDoctoral Fellow in Urban Economics. He is indebted to
Professors Alan Campbell and Jesse Burkhead,
suburban public finance differences,

and to

John Shannon for a helpful reading of an earlier draft,
these studies are primarily (and admitbut the analysis and conclusions remain the author's.

tedly) concerned largely with symptoms,*Economist,

Fiscal Affairs Department, International

Monetary Fund.
i.e., with the consequences of fiscal im'John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society
balance in the metropolitan region. The
(Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).

2For
basic problem remains to be concep-

tualized.

example see, Alan Campbell and Seymour Sacks,

Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmenr
Systems (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1967); and Adivsory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Fiscal
Because the statement of the urban
Balance in the American Federal System (Washington,
fiscal problem is typically made in terms
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1968).
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geared to alleviate d,
the
plig
=- Ri fiscal
- N, (I)
central cities, and (b) to examin
grounds

given that

(equity

and efficiency)
R1 R2 Rk

such a concoction of isolated corrective

devices might be preferable to an aggregative approach.

The Disparities Problem

on

w

Y1 Y2 Yk

Equation (2) imposes the co
fiscal effort exerted in each

of the metropolitan area
Definition. The problem of metroThen
if ad> 0 a fiscal dispa
politan fiscal disparities grows out of
lem exists where

income segregation in the urban com-

munity. Specifically, fiscal disparities re-

k

sult because the tax base (resources) in

the community is divorced from the

needs of the community (requirements),

a phenomenon made possible by gov-

(RI - N1)2
2-

d

K

ernmental fragmentation. But the point The
only
cas
often missed in examining the linkageproblem
exi

between balkanization and urban fiscal

i.e.,
if
0d2
=
problems is the part of the problemframework
m
which is uniquely metropolitan. Thatseparation
of

is, the existence of intercommunity (in-lems
from
f
trametropolitan) variations in the size because
of
m
of the resources-requirements gap is the equal
fiscal
k
manifestation of that part of the problem which results from metropolitanism.

Sd
-=1 = 0 but Od2 4= 0, positive disparThis is to be contrasted with the probities in some communities are just
lems which multiply increasingly with
equate to compensate communities wi
urbanism per se (e.g., transportation, air
negative disparities. Then, in the met
pollution, physical deterioration) since
politan area total resources are adequa
these may exist independent of the
to compensate requirements and t
structure of local government. A simple
variance
among communities in th
model may be used to describe these two
quality
of
public services is due sol
dimensions of the urban fiscal problem
to
the
governmental
structure whi
more clearly. Let
permits a separation of public sector r
R, = Tax revenues of the ith com-

quirements from tax base. Alternatively

munity

Ni = public service requirements of the
ith community

Yj = personal income of the ith community

K = number of communities in the

if Od2 0 and V di < 0, the metropolit
area is twice-damned in that not only
intergovernment variations in resources
requirement balance exist, but the tot

fiscal resources of the SMSA are not ad-

equate to meet public needs. Then after
"gainer" governments compensate "losThen the fiscal disparity (d1) for
ers," any
the remaining amount of negative
given community is defined as disparity defines the fiscal deficit which
metropolitan area
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URBAN FISCAL PROBLEM 43

politan government,
i.e., only because
may not be attributed
to balkanization.
there exists
core city or
low income
This, in fact, defines
the alarger
problem

suburb in
in which
to public
locate ball parks,
of underinvestment
the
secfreeway interchanges, and minorities.
Then this nonreciprocal, suburb-onThe Exploitation Argument. It now
city influence on public service levels,
remains to examine the reasons why retogether with the relatively greater pubquirements and resources may not balance in individual communities in the
lic goods choice of suburbanites, tends
to widen the resources-requirements gap
metropolitan area. There are at least

tor.3

core cities and to reduce it in subthree. First, because the central city in
is the
urbs.
home of a large fraction of the area's low These factors form a base from

which the urban-suburban exploitation
income population, it faces the dilemma
might be fully developed.
of servicing a high-cost population argument
with

a generally inadequate and declining

level of resources. Second, suburban res-

idents impose public service require-

Alternative Solutions

The fiscal trouble of central cities is
ments on the central city government
via trips by suburbanites into the the
cen-subject of much more than academic
concern. Any number of schemes have
tral city to work, to shop, or for entertainment. To the extent the city isbeen
notimplemented to revive the financial
position
of the central city, but these
compensated adequately by nonresident
attempts
have been largely uncoordiusers, the gap between resources and
requirements grows even wider. The nated
thirdand their net effect on the direc-

is a more subtle dimension of the "sub-

tion of fiscal disparities is not at all

The objective of this section is
urban-exploitation-of-the-core-city" certain.
ar-

to examine these varied schemes in the
gument, which grows out of the relahopes of making some judgment about
tively greater freedom of suburban

residents to reveal a preference for pubtheir over-all effect on fiscal disparities.

One might structure an evaluation of
lic services. For example, the subur-

the piecemeal approach to reducing
banite may be able to exert some control
disparities
around the six most often
on the expanse of public programs
-

sidewalks, streetlights, mosquito control,
discussed

remedial policies: (a) the

utilization of local taxing
police protection, parks, snow and increased
ice
removal - while the core city dweller
powers, (b) the direction of federal pol-

icya toward a renewal of the core city,
(since the city must serve the needs of
(c) the direction of state government
large commuter population) necessarily
has much less to say about the sizefiscal
or
activity toward a balancing of
composition of his public package.
needs and requirements within SMSAs,
Moreover, it is entirely likely that the
(d) the creation of metropolitan governlevel and composition of city services
ment, areawide provisions of public serwill be determined to some extent by

suburban residents. The reverse situa-

tion is much less probable. This rela3 This

is not exactly true if public facility needs in-

tively greater suburban freedom of
pubcrease
at an increasing rate with increments in poverty
though agglomerative effects could be aclic goods choice is in fact possiblepopulation,
only
counted for with some adjustment to the simple model
because there exists fragmented metropresented here.

This content downloaded from
131.96.28.155 on Tue, 25 Oct 2022 14:43:58 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

44

LAND

ECONOMICS

or some taxes.
other
of
geo
The base form
would seem to
imply
that benefits received
from a shopping
political expansion
capable
of
nalizing externalities,
trip are proportional to the
and
dollar vol(e)
directed at controlling
ume of consumption or
expenditures,
at leas
a
highly questionable
assumption. As in
encing the physical
development

vices,

certain
its public
the case of theof
local occupational
levy,
it does not seem probable that the choice
Increased Local Government Revof a rate is dictated by nonresident service the
cost estimates. More likely is the
enues. One possibility for capturing
possibility
that the rate is chosen only
cost of nonresident use of core city seron
a
basis
of
yield considerations.
vices is to levy a user charge for public
services. But for the most part it is
In not
general, then, taxes designed to
a proportion of the suburban poppossible to assess a specific user bring
charge
for the service, e.g., what is a ulation
unit ofwithin the core city fiscal base
do not have rate structures which are
police protection? Nonetheless, realizing
that benefits from some core city
procompatible
with the objective of excity

characteristics.

and/or

vided services do in fact leak uncom-

tracting a payment from the nonresident

pensated out of the community,which
city is exactly equivalent to benefits

received. Whether nonresidents over or
financial planners have installed occupaundercompensate the core city for services rendered may not be determined.
are levied at the point of economic acIn defense of the autonomous local levy,
tivity rather than at the place of residence.
some governmental income redistributional and retail sales taxes. These taxes

The local occupational or earningstion does occur. Perhaps rough justice

tax is usually levied as a flat rate at theis all that may be expected in public

finance.
place of employment.4 If one assumes
value-added to be an appropriate mea- Consider now the possible resource

allocation effects of these local revenue
sure of benefits received from city services, the payroll tax base would seem
measures. For example, assume that the

amount of police services furnished,
appropriate on equity grounds. But to
relative to other public services, is some
arrive at a proper rate implies some estimate of the per resident cost of the function of the relative cost of these
specific services to be supported from public services, the latter measured in
this tax, and this has not even been atper city resident terms. If in the subsetempted. Indeed, where total receipts quent time period there is increased
are bound for the general fund, such ansuburban commuting into the core city
estimate would not seem possible. More such that the cost per city resident for
probably the rate is dictated by yield police services rises relative to all other
considerations alone - how much is to
public goods,5 and such that local govbe raised from the new tax. Then if an

earnings tax were to extract from suburban residents an amount equal to the
'Though in at least one state receipts are shared
equally between the city of employment and the city of
value of the central city services which
residence.
they consume, it would be merely a co5 The example of police versus all other public goods
incidence. Much of the same criticism

is taken here to represent the more general dichotomy
between public goods on which nonresidents draw heavily

may be leveled at local consumer and
sales
those on which they do not.
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URBAN FISCAL PROBLEM 45

ernment decision makers realize that

would seem possible. Proposed federal
benefits from police services are being
housing policy would encourage low incomebe
families to settle in the urban
increasingly exported, the result will

a decline in police services relative
to while some federal redevelopfringe

other public goods. Since local residents'
ment money has been used to attract
higher income residents to the central
preference for police relative to other
public services has not necessarily
city. With a current strong movement
changed, the urban-suburban interacof industrial plant sites (and thus blue

tion has caused a misallocation of

collar jobs) to the suburbs, proposed

resources. Then, even if there is comfederal legislation which would subsipensation in the form of sales or income
dize lower income residents purchasing

taxes, only an income effect will be exa home would seem particularly well
erted. If compensation is more thantimed. In this view - providing central

adequate, an over-all higher level ofcity residents with a wider choice of

public services will result, but the city
type and location of housing - income
maintenance programs including rent
will be underspending on police vis-avis other public programs.6 Only if it
and mortgage interest subsidies could
were possible to extract the appropriate
contribute markedly to the reduction of
fiscal imbalances. However, under cercharge from each nonresident user of
public services, and if public decision
tain conditions these plans might have
makers viewed these services as being
the effect of accentuating needs-resaleable on a unit basis, and if there
sources imbalances. If a housing aid prowere excess capacity for each service in
gram enables qualified Negroes to
question - would a user charge system
purchase suburban homes, it will debe distributionally neutral and have no
prive the core city of much of the
effect on the allocation process.
productive citizenry it has left. Those
Federal Government Policy. If the
remaining behind will be of the lowest
tendency for metropolitan population
economic class, now without the opporgrowth and decentralization to be actunity to interact with the higher income of even their own race. The fiscal
companied by pronounced spatial in-

come fragmentation could be reversed,
position of the core city could grow even
worse.
governmental fiscal imbalances would

be less severe and large central cities Further, history would suggest th
might avoid the process of cumulativethe suburban jurisdictions into wh

decay. This kind of policy, aimed atthe Negro moves may not fare m
eliminating or at least alleviating the
better. Negro demands for central c

conditions basically responsible for fiscal
housing in the 1950s held home valu

imbalances, may be contrasted readily

with local revenue measures which are

designed to preserve the tax base by exa This example is oversimplified to state the fu
panding the units it covers.
mental point that, even though total spending on p
Though there would seem to be little
services may be higher if nonresidents are assessed
commuting charge, relative spending on police ser
probability of completely reversing the
may be lower than in the absence of urban-subu
interactions. However, it remains a possibility that
pattern of metropolitan growth, a parresult of the in-commuting, core city residents' ut
tial restructuring of the socio-economic

functions (hence the optimal distribution of p

dispersion of the SMSA population
funds)

is affected.
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high enough position
to enable
whites
of the central city
in the comadvantage ofpetition
the
FHA
program
for new industry.
move to the suburbs-a
"trickl
State Government Policy.
The two
effect. It is significant
to
note
general routes open for
state
govern- t

Negro was an ments
active
in thi
to offsetagent
urban fiscal disparities
cess. It is conceivable
thatofthe
pr
are the direct assumption
functions
subsidized, Negro
demand
for
su
now performed
at the local level
and the

housing

will

"trick
programs. In either case, intrametroficiently high to enable white residents
politan fiscal disparities could be reof relatively low income suburbs
to
duced.
Campbell describes the first of
move even further out to newer and
these possibilities for reducing metro"whiter" communities. Then two conpolitan fiscal imbalances.
sequences may be speculated upon: (1)
If welfare in New York State were transthe desired income and racial desegreeffect - home values will be held suf-

extension
and reform
of state assistance
again
have
a

ferred from the units which presently
gation may not result from this federal
administer it - New York City and outhousing program, and (2) since "central
side of New York City, mostly counties
cities" with suburban locations could re- the disparity in fiscal effort (local
sult, fiscal imbalances could be accentaxes as a proportion of income) between
tuated rather than reduced.

New York City and its suburbs would be

reduced from the present 28 per cent
The potential effects of other federal

difference to 11 per cent. In other words,

programs on the problem of metro-in the case of New York City the result

politan fiscal disparities varies widely,would still leave the city with a higher
fiscal effort than its surrounding subat least some of these programs being
urbs, but would reduce the gap considclearly at odds with any objective of
erably - for the country's twenty-two
diffusing the city's poor throughout the
largest metropolitan areas the gap would

metropolitan area. The model city planbe decreased from 33 to 18 percent.7
is aimed at rehabilitating rather than
Then if services which bear most heaveliminating the ghetto neighborhoods,
ily on cities with heavy concentrations
therefore may not eliminate disparities,
of
even in the long run. In fact, metro- poverty families were transferred to

state government, public service repolitan fiscal imbalances could be in-

quirements would be reduced relatively
creased by virtue of the feature in many

in core cities than in suburbs. In
model city proposals which calls for more
an
increase in the level of public services
this fashion, fiscal disparities are genuinely reduced, though not eliminated
provided in ghetto areas. Alternatively,
federal urban renewal assistance can
since resources still vary widely because
of of
income fragmentation in the SMSA.
work (theoretically) in the direction
The second route open to the state
reducing city-suburb fiscal imbalances

involves alterating aid systems. The
by cutting at both sides of the resources-

problem is not only one of increasing
requirements gap. Replacement of slums
with middle-to-high income residential
development at once provides the central city with a lower cost citizenry and
7 Alan K. Campbell, "Metropolitan Organization,
an expanded fiscal base. Further,
rePolitics and Taxation," Municipal Income Taxes, Pro-

newal of the core also enhances the

ceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 1968, p. 567.
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vide some
incentive
for firms to exlocate
aids to local units but
of
revising
isting state programs and/or
to correct
distribuexpand in the
core city.

tion formulae which Areawide
have Financing
long favored
or Governmental
rural and suburban areas
at
expense
Reorganization.the
In the presence
of true
of core cities. If permetropolitan
student
education
government, fiscal disparfinancing needs are ities
higher
in since
the
core
cannot exist,
there
can be no

city than the suburbs
divorce because
of tax base from of
fiscal the
needs.8

particular needs of children
from
povBut the prospects
for wholesale
adoperty areas, a distribution
of
state
education of metro are not great - its leading

tion aids which reflects this difference

spokesman sees only a baker's dozen by

could move the local fisc a giant step
the year 2000.9 However, areawide ar-

in the direction of balance. Very little
rangements for public facility financing

has been done along these lines but
are becoming increasingly popular in
some examples of at least an underthe form of special districts to handle
standing of the problem are available.
specific problems which cross jurisdic-

First, the education aid distribution in

Connecticut has been amended to re-

tional boundaries, an expanded role for
the urban county in serving both in-

flect need differentials, a revision which
corporated and unincorporated areas,

should greatly benefit the state's
core
the
development of more elaborate
programs and institutions for compretion in Jefferson County (Louisville)
hensive regional planning, and the reKentucky for the levy of a county-wide
organization of voluntary associations
occupational tax, earmarked for educaof area governments in metropolitan
tion, with the proceeds to be distributed
areas.'x Though these steps do enable
between the city and county school diselimination of fiscal disparities for the
tricts on a basis of average daily attenfunctions concerned, it is interesting to
dance. The first of these examplesnote that the case for consolidation is
reflects an actual attempt to take actraditionally made in efficiency rather
count of local differences in per student
than governmental equity terms - the
financial needs while the latter is an exexistence of economies of scale, spillample of a state government taking an overs, and "local government proximactive role in matching jurisdictionality" are taken as the major justifications
cities. The second is the state authoriza-

needs with areawide resources.

for recommending areawide financing."
Another approach which might alleviThis position has led to permissive state

ate metropolitan fiscal disparities in-

volves balancing city and suburban fiscal
burden to accomplish a transfer of real
sIf an imbalance between needs and public service
income from suburb to core city. Inlevels
thisin certain areas within the SMSA is greater than
vein the state might attempt reliefthe
ofimbalance in others, the problem is one of redefining the equity parameter in the metropolitan govspatial tax regressivity, as opposed to
in- objective function. But this is not the disparity
ernment's
problem since the resource dimension is not relevant.
come class tax regressivity, by providing
o Daniel R. Grant, "Trends in Urban Government and
either lower personal tax rates or increAdministration," Law and Contemporary Problems,
mental exemptions for residents ofWinter
the 1965, pp. 48-50.
10 Ibid., p. 50.
central city. This approach has been sugS tSee for example, Werner Z. Hirsh, "Expenditure
of Metropolitan Growth and Consolidagested for the taxation of firms onImplications
the
tion," Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1959,
theory that relief from taxes may pp.
pro323-41.
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government legislation
which
conditions, proximity to
home, back- en
the provision of
certain
services
o
ground
of students (all
potential adareawide basis. vantages
Almost
immediately
of the suburban
district) and a
legislation was higher
translated
into
area
salary. The size of the
salary dif-

ference to
be maintained could be
provision of the
"hardware"
ser
such as water determined
supply
and
sewage
by trial
and error,
since

posal. But the hardware
functions
the locational employment
decisions of
teachers
would reveal their relative
evalamong the few
services
where
the
tral city realized
a
generally
higher
uation of higher salaries.
of service per unit
price
than the
Yet a second
policy of governmental

urbs. On the whole,
a good
argum
control, local building
and zoning recould be made
that
permissive
s
strictions,
has a perverse
effect on fiscal

legislation

fect

imbalances.

on

has

hadTheat
a neutra
balance.
resultbest
is to simultaneously

metropolitan
urban-subu
facilitate income fragmentation
in the
SMSA and provide an impediment to

In general, there is little fault to be
redevelopment of the core city. Brazer
found with areawide financing schemes
relates the disparities problem directly

as a remedy to the problem of interto suburban zoning practices which

government, interarea resource-require". .. through zoning regulations and
ment imbalances. By internalizing
discriminatory practices in rentals and
externalities, allocative efficiency is pre- real estate transactions, contribute di-

served, and by bringing the function rectly to the concentration in the central
under a single decision making unit a city of socio-economic groups which imuniform quality of services may be pro- pose heavy demands upon local governvided with burden differentials depen- ment services. . . ."12 Robert Wood,
dent only on the taxing device used writing on the same subject, argues:
rather than on the jurisdiction of res-

idence.

For if the powers of local government

are used strategically, the original settlers
Other Policies of Control. There are of
a suburban town can refuse to be
also general local government control overwhelmed by the onrush of populadevices which have potentially an im- tion from the city. They can, by zoning,

portant bearing on the disparities prob- residential covenants, selective industrial
lem. The first may be illustrated by a development, taxation, and informal pat-

somewhat novel suggestion that the

terns of segregation, literally choose their

action to control the levels of suburban

clerks, craftsmen, and laborers within

own fellow citizens. Because they do not

growing intrametropolitan disparity in
have to reproduce all the parts of a self
education services be checked by local contained economic system and admit
their boundaries, a degree of homogeand city teacher salaries. The basis of
neity
can be achieved. . . . The central
such a suggestion is that, if core city

salaries were maintained at some level

city becomes a receptable for all the

above suburban salaries, it would be

possible for city systems to bid teachers
away from suburban systems. From the
12Harvey Brazer, "Some Fiscal Implications of Metropolitanism," Metropolitan Issues: Social, Governmental,
point of view of the teacher this would
Fiscal, Guthrie Birkhead, ed., (Syracuse, New York: Syra-

involve a trade-off between working
cuse University Press, 1962).
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functions the suburb dweller does not

individuals in the SMSA's which give
rise to the disparities problem are so
complicated that the final
If zoning devices are successfulfantastically
in

care to support.13

impulses of any change in public policy
maintaining socio-economic segregation
do not seem traceable, and (c) the sheer
in the suburbs, they are also of some imnumber
of governmental programs and
portance in impeding new construction
natural
growth
factors which conceivin the central city. Building restrictions
ably could affect the fiscal balance of a
do not give the core city a comparative

metropolitan region is immense, and
advantage in small scale redevelopment
or new development in that they areonly
in- with complete enumeration could
a net effect be described. These considevitably more severe at the core than in
erations coupled with the discussion in
outlying areas. Local property tax polthea preceding section would seem to
icy may also be at cross purposes with
suggest
that if the current piecemeal
disparity-reducing restructure of metroapproach
did move the metropolitan fisc
politan populations. Netzer writes that
toward
balance,
it would not be through
the real fiscal problems connected with
design.
Moreover,
it does not seem that
city rebuilding programs relate to the
choice of fiscal instruments used for fia predictable, coordinated piecemeal approach is even possible since the policy
nancing rather than to the fiscal capacity
decisions
are multigovernmental and
of the city.14 High central city taxes on
decentralized,
and the nature of the inbusiness or taxes which discourage reterdependencies among programs is
building the core city are in the long
run a deterrent to the increases in both
virtually unknown. There is even some
basis for the contention that the pieceeconomic activity and real property
meal approach to the financial problems
values in the central city. Then, the net
of cities multiplies rather than reduces
effect of zoning, building codes, and
fiscal imbalances.15 There is some thelocal property taxes is probably to inoretical justification for this argument.
crease fiscal disparities. At best these
Baumol notes "what the second best
governmental policies provide little intells us and emphasizes rightly
ducement for remaining or locating theorem
in
is
that
the
partial and mechanistic imthe core city.
position of Pareto optimum conditions
is very likely to make things worse."16
Conclusions: Piecemeal vs.
Aggregative Solutions

Ideally, the jumbled set of interrea Robert

lated effects on fiscal balance of each of

C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their

Politics (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Comp. 106.
these policies would be unwoven and pany,
a 14 Dick1959),
Netzer, The Urban Fiscal Problem, Institute
clear net effect of the aggregate of govof Local Government, University of Pittsburgh, 1967,
7.
ernmental policy could be identified.p. 15
See for example, the metropolitan case studies in
But (a) each governmental program hasFiscal Issues in the Future of Federalism, Supplementary
a multiplicity of direct and indirect ef-Paper 23 (New York, New York: Committee for Eco-

nomic Development, 1968) and in Fiscal Balance . . .

fects, some of which may not even beop. cit.

16William J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the
measurable, (b) the interdependenciesTheory
of the State 2nd edition (Cambridge, Massachu-

among the governments and among thesetts: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 30-32.
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on the part of suburban
the
could
alsolegislators,
be levele
"pass-through" problem will most certainly have to be solved at the federal
(commuter) charges, where applicable,
level.
with state aids (the latter to eliminate
any residual imbalances). Moreover,
On the other hand, an aggregativecomparative evaluation of piecemeal
state government coordinated approach
and aggregate approaches requires
conwould
seem to afford a greater possibil-

This

critique

solution which would combine user

sideration of the costs incurred in mak-

ity of achieving intermetropolitan fiscal

ing arrangements to insure optimal
balance. It is clear at once that an ag-

output.17 It would surely be less expengregative approach and a multigovernsive to modify state aid systems than mental
to
decision-making process are not

devise and install a system of user charge
compatible. The strong alternative of

- commuter taxes.

the state government's assuming a coThere are also substantive ordinating
arguments
role in balancing the SMSA
against the aggregative (state
fiscaid)
is a seemingly
soluappropriate solution
tion - that it has a distortive effect on
given that growing levels of urbanizathe allocative decisions of core city govtion are forcing state governments into
ernments. Spillouts of benefits by coma greater urban orientation anyway. The
munity A, about which residents ofstate
A government alone would seem in a

are aware, will lead to an underalloca-

position to shape the fiscal balance

tion of resources by A. Even if state
among local governments in SMSA's.

aids (spillins) are adequate to eliminateFirst, it has a broader tax base than any

local government. Second, the state
disparities (to make the externalities

distributionally neutral), allocative ef-could create an aid policy which could
reduce resource-requirements gaps and
ficiency will suffer. Aid may exert only

an income effect on the choice between

simultaneously equalize tax burdens.
public and private, and among publicThird, the state could control the progoods. For example, Weisbrod's analysisliferation of local government within
of interstate education expenditure the metropolitan area and thereby revariance indicates that benefit spilloutsduce the potential for financial imbal(measured as population out-migration)ance. Fourth, the state can (and already
have a significant dampening influencedoes in many states) administer a planon expenditures, given that interstate ning agency capable of controlling the

variations in the relative contributions

intergovernmental variance in public

of federal-state-local governments are service levels. Finally, federal aids could
held constant.1s The other major critique be "passed through" the state level to
of a state solution is political ratherassure conformity with an over-all plan
than economic in nature. The allocative
to maintain some desired financial balance
within the urban area.
decisions of state legislatures have in recent years been dominated by the vested
interests of the suburbs and, given current population trends, there is little to 17 R. H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Costs," Journal
indicate a natural change in the balanceof Law and Economics, October 1960, pp. 1-44.
18 Burton Weisbrod, External Benefits and Public
of political power within states. In the Education (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
absence of some new-found benevolence Press, 1964), Chapter 9.
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